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Abstract
If individuals care about their status, dened as their rank in the distribution of conspicuous
consumption, a fall in the level of visible inequality is likely to cause them to spend more on
conspicuous goods due to increased status competition. I examine this hypothesis using micro
data from rural India. Employing an identication strategy based on instrumental variables, I
nd robust evidence that visible inequality has a negative and signicant impact on household
conspicuous consumption. Further, my results indicate that the increase in conspicuous expenditure
in response to a fall in visible inequality is diverted from education spending which is perceived to
have positive social externalities. This suggests that traditional redistributive policies that seek to
reduce the level of economic inequality, by encouraging wastefulspending of households, might
have adverse welfare consequences.
JEL Classication: D12, O12, Z13.
1 Introduction
Social status has always been considered among the most compelling inducements of human be-
havior.1 People care about social status not only for the sake of itself but also because high social
status confers many material and non-material benets (Truyts, 2010). As Weiss and Fershtman
(1998, p. 802) put it:
A person of high status expects to be treated favorably by other individuals with whom
he might engage in social and economic interactions. This favorable treatment can
take many forms: transfer of market goods, transfer of non-market goods (through
marriage, for instance), transfer of authority (letting the high status person be the
leader), modied behavior (such as deference or cooperation) and symbolic acts (such
as showing respect).
Although the idea of social status is somewhat abstract, one can loosely describe social status of
individuals as their relative position in the society that can be displayedto their peers. According
to Veblen (1899), the chief way to displaysocial status is through conspicuous consumption, which
refers to spending money or other resources on goods that are positionaland socially visible.2
Conforming to this argument, economists have traditionally modeled social status of individuals
as their relative rank in the distribution of conspicuous consumption within their peer or reference
group, with higher rank implying higher status (e.g. Frank, 1985; Robson, 1992).
Under the assumption that individuals derive positive utility from status tied to their rank
in the distribution of conspicuous consumption, it can be argued that their incentive to consume
conspicuous goods increases as the dispersion in conspicuous consumption expenditure within their
reference group falls. Dening dispersion in conspicuous consumption expenditure as visible in-
equality,3 this implies that there is likely to exist a negative relationship between conspicuous
consumption expenditure of individuals and reference group visible inequality.
1The idea that social status is a key motivator of human behavior goes back to the writings of early economists
like Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) and sociologists such as Bourdieu (1979).
2According to Hirsch (1976), positional goods are those for which social pressure a¤ects choices more (e.g. clothing,
cars, etc.). Socially visible goods are those that are easily observable in social interactions.
3Visible inequality, as the term suggests, is the level of economic inequality that is socially visible since this is
measured based upon conspicuous consumption which is purely a visible act.
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The intuition underlying the argument above follows from an interesting paper by Hopkins
and Kornienko (2009) and can be explained follows: A fall in the level of reference group visible
inequality or equivalently a compression of the within-reference group distribution of conspicuous
consumption increases individualsmarginal returns from investing in conspicuous goods since a
given increase in conspicuous consumption now allows one to jump over more of ones contempo-
raries.4 This, therefore, encourages those who belong to the lower end of the social ladder (i.e. the
distribution of conspicuous consumption) to spend more on conspicuous goods in order to over-
take the ones who are further up the social ladder in the contest for social status. This, in turn,
strengthens the incentives for those belonging to the middle and higher end of the social ladder
to acquire more conspicuous goods in order to defend their social status. Put more succinctly, if
people are status concerned, a fall in the level of reference group visible inequality, by intensifying
the degree of competition for social status, causes conspicuous consumption of every individual to
rise.
Interestingly, the increase in the individuals conspicuous expenditure in response to a fall
in visible inequality not only represents ine¢ cient transfers from spending on others goods (e.g.
healthcare, education) and/or savings (Frank, 2000), but is also wasteful from a social stand
point (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004). This is because, although everyone increases spending on
conspicuous goods owing to higher status competition, any gain in status is cancelled out by the
similarly increased expenditure of others. As Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) remark, this situation
is very similar to the Red Queen e¤ect in Lewis Carrolls Through the Looking Glassin which it
takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.
In this paper, I empirically examine whether a fall in the level of reference group visible in-
equality by augmenting status competition causes conspicuous consumption of households to
increase, particularly in a less developed country setting. To do so, I use household level data from
rural India. I dene a households reference group as other households living in its village. Strik-
ingly, I nd that reference group visible inequality has a signicant negative impact on household
conspicuous consumption expenditure given permanent income and other demographic controls.
More specically, a one standard deviation decline in visible inequality within the reference group
4 In other words, the marginal utility from investing in status is higher in a more densely packed reference group
since the closer the individuals are together, the easier is it to get ahead of others in status.
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causes household conspicuous spending to increase by roughly 15%. This clearly lends support to
the hypothesis of status competition. I also nd that the sign of the e¤ect of visible inequality on
conspicuous consumption is consistently negative across di¤erent subsamples (although the magni-
tude of the e¤ect varies when the sample is cut in certain ways). Further, my results indicate that
the higher conspicuous spending of the rural households is drawn from education spending. This is
particularly a reason for concern since cutting down expenditure on education not only might cause
households to become more economically vulnerable and less resilient to economic shocks in the
long run, but it might also have severe negative social spillover e¤ects. Thus, my ndings suggest
that public policies that are designed to reduce economic inequality might have serious unintended
consequences.
Empirical evidence relating to conspicuous consumption is scarce. Charles et al. (2009) examine
the impact of race on conspicuous consumption behavior in the context of the United States and
show that Blacks and Hispanics devote larger shares of their expenditure bundles to conspicuous
goods than do comparable Whites. Khamis et al. (2012), Kaus (2013) and Chai and Kaus (2013)
provide additional evidence of the robust link between social identity and conspicuous consumption
using data from developing countries like India and South Africa. Brown et al. (2011) empirically
analyse the causes of a sharp increase in conspicuous consumption in recent years in China. He¤etz
(2011), in an interesting paper, using data from the United States relates income elasticities of
goods to their level of visibility. Friehe and Mechtel (2014) provide evidence on the inuence of
political regimes on the relative importance of conspicuous consumption using German data.
Of these studies, only Brown et al. (2011) and Chai and Kaus (2013) explore the idea of
status competition as a possible explanation of their ndings. These studies provide evidence of
a link between reference group income inequality and conspicuous consumption of individuals and
interpret the mechanism underlying this link as status competition. Their assumption, therefore, is
that competition for status or rank that inuences conspicuous spending of individuals, is primarily
driven by within reference group income inequality. However, this approach is hampered by the fact
that income of an individual is an opaque measure and unobserved by peers or neighbors (Hicks and
Hicks, 2014). Therefore, attributing behavioral responses of individuals to income inequality within
a reference group seems inappropriate since a prerequisite of a measure of inequality to trigger any
sort of behavioral response must be that it is observable by individuals (so as to allow them to
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condition their behavior on). Also, from an econometric perspective income inequality as the main
explanatory variable is likely to generate problem of measurement error in the regression as income
inequality, although is observable to the econometrician, is not something that households know.
The present paper circumvents this issue by focusing on visible inequality. This is likely to
more appropriately match both theory and intuition, compared to use of income inequality to
examine the inequality-status competition-conspicuous consumption relationship. Unlike income,
conspicuous consumption of others in the reference group is visible. Hence an inequality metric
based on conspicuous consumption, is what should actually be used to capture a behavioral response
like status competition. The creation of this novel measure of inequality to examine how status
competition inuences conspicuous consumption is, in fact, the main contribution of this paper.
Additionally, this paper extends the literature which looks at social preferences (such as desires for
rank or status) and conspicuous consumption, specically, in a less developed country context. As
such, the results of this study are likely to be useful for the policymakers to design more e¤ective
redistributive programs and social safety nets to reduce economic inequality and alleviate poverty.
The paper unfolds as follows. In section two, I layout the basic econometric framework, describe
the data, discuss various issues related to model identication and nally present the identication
and estimation strategy. The results are presented in section three. The last section concludes.
2 Empirics
2.1 Econometric Model
Consider an economy consisting of G non-overlapping social groups (g = 1; 2; :::; G) and let Ng
denote the number of households (i = 1; 2; :::; Ng) that belong to the gth group. A social group -
also referred to as reference group or peer group - is dened as a structure in which households are
potentially tied by a social link. I assume that household i who belongs to group g is excluded from
his own reference group. Given this setting of social interactions, the main econometric model that
I intend to estimate is the following:
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ln(Conspicuous Consumption)ig = + (V isible Inequality) ig +  ln(Permanent Income)ig
+X0ig+ ig; (1)
i = 1; 2; :::Ng; g = 1; 2; :::; G:
My dependent variable, ln(Conspicuous Consumption)ig, is the (log) annual expenditure on
conspicuous goods of household i who belongs to group g. My variable of interest, (V isible
Inequality) ig; is the reference group visible inequality faced by household i (the negative sign
before the subscript denotes household i is excluded from his reference group). Since, in this pa-
per, visible inequality refers to the dispersion of conspicuous consumption, I use the (log) standard
deviation of conspicuous consumption (ln(Conspicuous Consumption)) calculated based upon
conspicuous spending of all households belonging to a particular group except the focal household
as my baseline measure of reference group visible inequality. I will use other inequality metrics to
measure visible inequality (namely, coe¢ cient of variation and Gini index) as robustness checks for
my baseline results.
The control variables include (log) Permanent Incom _e5 of household i and a vector of de-
mographic characteristics X, which include variables that might be correlated with household
consumption expenditure. The error term ig reects other unobservable characteristics associated
with i: It is likely to consist of two components
ig = g + "ig (2)
where g and "ig are group- and household-specic components of the error respectively.
In equation (1), the parameter of interest is  which measures the e¤ect of reference group visible
inequality on conspicuous spending of households. A nonzero  coe¢ cient implies that households
conspicuous expenditure depends on the level of reference group visible inequality. Note that if
 < 0, conspicuous spending of households declines with reference group visible inequality, which
5 I control for permanent income instead of current income because current income comprises of a transitory as
well as a permanent component and it is only the permanent component of current income that impacts consumption
expenditure (Modigliani and Brumberg,1954; Friedman, 1957).
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is consistent with the status competition hypothesis.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 The Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2005
This paper uses the rural sub-sample of the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2005 which
is a nationally representative household survey conducted by the National Council for Applied
Economic Research (NCAER) in New Delhi and University of Maryland (Desai, Reeve and NCAER,
2009).
The IHDS survey - conducted between November 2004 and October 2005 - covers 41,554 house-
holds in 1,503 rural villages and 971 urban neighborhoods located throughout India.6 The rural
sub-sample of the IHDS covers 26,734 households. As pointed out by Khamis et al. (2012), the
main advantage of using this survey is that it includes many questions that are not asked in the
larger and more commonly used Indian household survey, the National Sample Survey (NSS). In
particular, detailed questions on income and consumption expenditure are asked in the IHDS which
are important for my analysis.
2.2.2 Conspicuous Consumption
There are forty-seven consumption categories in the IHDS. Thirty of the consumption categories,
which are frequently purchased items, use a thirty day time frame while the other seventeen use a
three hundred and sixty ve day time frame. I convert all expenditures to the annual time frame
before estimation.
Conspicuous consumption is understood as the use of money or other resources to display
ones high social status in relation to others (Veblen, 1899). Goods that are particularly suited
to this objective should (i) be readily observable, and (ii) give the impression that individuals
who consume more of them are, on average, better o¤ than those who consume less of them. To
determine the composition of the conspicuous consumption basket, Khamis et al. (2012) conducted
an online survey in India. This survey was modeled after the conspicuous goods surveys conducted
6The survey covered all the states and union territories of India except Andaman and Nicobar, and Lakshadweep.
These two account for less than 0.05 percent of Indias population. The data is publicly available from the Data
Sharing for Demographic Research program of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR).
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by Charles et al. (2009) and He¤etz (2011) both of which were carried out in the United States.
In this paper I adopt Khamis et al.s (2012) denition of conspicuous goods since to my knowl-
edge this is the rst and, until now, the only survey conducted in India. Moreover, this survey
was designed specically to determine the conspicuousness of the consumption goods covered in
the IHDS. Based on Khamis et al.s (2012) survey, I consider conspicuous consumption to consist
of personal transport equipment, footwear, vacations, furniture and xtures, social functions, re-
pair and maintenance, house rent and other rents, entertainment, clothing and bedding, jewelry
and ornaments, recreation goods and personal goods. Conspicuous consumption does not include
goods and services with little or no visibility and/or limited status e¤ects, such as food consumed
at home, insurance premiums, books, tobacco, education and health expenditures. I will use the
denitions of conspicuous consumption proposed by Charles et al. (2009), He¤etz (2011) and Friehe
and Mechtel (2014) as robustness checks for my baseline analysis (Table SA1 in the Supplementary
Appendix provides a list of the conspicuous goods as per each denition).
2.2.3 Reference Group
Given the lack of information on the structure of relevant social interactions in the IHDS data,
I assume that the peer group or the reference group of a household is comprised of all other
households in its village. The latent assumption is that a households own village serves as the self-
evaluative space that it uses to make social comparisons and assess its relative economic position.
This is probably a reasonable assumption given that villages are basically small geographic units7
populated by households who are similarin many dimensions and are exposed to similar geographic
and institutional conditions (Singer, 1981). Moreover, social interactions are also more likely to
take place among people living in the same locality which may in turn a¤ect household decision
making (Akerlof, 1997).8 Consequently, the reference group visible inequality corresponding to
a particular household is computed as the (log) standard deviation of conspicuous consumption
expenditure of all other households in its village.
7The average area of villages included in the IHDS 2005 is approximately 3.3 square miles.
8Cojocaru (2014) summarizes various empirical studies conrming that reference groups that are used by individ-
uals for social comparisons are indeed local.
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2.2.4 Permanent Income and Demographics
IHDS reports current income of households which is the sum total (for each household) of wages
and salaries, non-farm business income, net agricultural income, remittances, property and other
income and public benets.9 I, however, need a measure of permanent income which is extremely
di¢ cult to get from survey data. Previous literature has generally relied on proxying permanent
income by using one or more of the following variables: average current income, education level
(Dynan et al., 2004), total consumption expenditure (Charles et al., 2009; Khamis et al. 2012), etc.
Following these studies, I use total consumption expenditure as a proxy for permanent income.
The set of demographic controls can be classied into two categories: characteristics of house-
hold heads and socioeconomic features of households. Characteristics of household heads include
age, quadratic in age, gender, marital status, literacy status and educational attainment (if liter-
ate). Also a set of dummy variables indicating caste/religious a¢ liation are included: Brahmin,
non-Brahmin high caste, other backward caste (OBC), Dalit, Adivasi, Muslim, Christian, and a
combined category for Sikhs and Jains.
The socioeconomic features of households that are used as controls are: household size, number
of years they have been living in their current village, o¢ cial socioeconomic status (i.e. whether the
household can o¢ cially be categorized as poor),10 proportion of children, adolescents and adults
in the household, number of married household members and binary variables indicating the extent
of media exposure of men, women and children in the household.11
9Each of these incomes are in turn constructed from more than fty di¤erent sources of income queried in the
survey.
10The classication of households into poor and non-poor socioeconomic groups is based on the denition of
poverty line used in the IHDS. The poverty line varies by state and urban/rural residence. It is based on 1970s
calculations of income needed to support minimal calorie consumption and has been adjusted by price indexes since
then.
11To capture media exposure of households, the IHDS asks every household head how often do men, women and
children in the household (i) listen to the radio, (ii) read the newspaper and (iii) watch TV. Household heads had
to respond either by saying Never(=0), Sometimes(=1) or Regularly(=2). Based on this question, I create my
variables of media exposure. In particular, I create three dummy variables capturing media exposure of each group
(i.e. men, women and children) in the household. The dummy takes a zero value if a particular group neither reads
newspaper, nor listens to radio, nor watches TV, and takes a value 1 otherwise. Note that it is important to include
these variables in my analysis as previous studies have documented signicant impact of social media exposure on
consumption-savings decisions of households (see for e.g. Schor, 1998).
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2.2.5 Analytic Sample
My estimation sample consists of 23,471 households from 1,468 villages located across 277 districts:
these are households in the IHDS where I have individual level information for household heads
and for which household head is between 18 and 65 years of age, annual household current income
is more than or equal to zero but less than Rs. 1,000,000 (equivalent to $16,667), annual household
total consumption expenditure is more than zero but less than Rs. 1,000,000, annual household
conspicuous consumption expenditure is more than or equal to zero, information on households
literacy level and educational attainment are non-missing and nally the household lives in a village
with not less than three (sampled) members.12
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis. The mean
annual household conspicuous consumption expenditure is around Rs. 8,200 (equivalent to $126).
The mean of within reference group standard deviation of annual household conspicuous spending
(i.e. visible inequality) is around Rs.13,500 (equivalent to $208). The mean annual total household
consumption is around Rs. 45,000 (equivalent to $692). On average, 13% of total household
consumption expenditure represents conspicuous consumption. The mean annual household current
income is around Rs. 40,000 (equivalent to $615). Each household, on average, has ve members.
The mean age of household head is 44. Around 91% of the households are male-headed and of
all the household heads, 60% are literate and 88% are married. The caste/religion-composition of
the analytic sample is as follows: 18% of the households are members of high castes, 33% belong
to OBC, 23% are Dalits, 11% are Adivasis, 9% are Muslims, 1% are Sikhs/Jains and the rest are
Christians. Finally, the average number of households sampled from each village included in my
analytic sample is 18 (implying that, on an average, a typical households reference group consists
of 17 households).
2.3 Identication Issues
There are several challenges in identifying the parameters of my baseline econometric model. Firstly,
there may be some unobservable environmental attributes that are specic to reference groups
12Households with zero conspicuous consumption expenditure and zero total consumption expenditure are incopo-
rated in the analysis by using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (Burbidge et al., 1988) since these variables
enter the empirical model in logarithmic form. See Friedline et al. (2015) for detailed description of this approach.
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and/or common to all members of a particular group. Econometrically, this would imply existence
of non-zero correlation between the group unobservables, g, and reference group visible inequality,
(V isible Inequality) ig, (and possibly other regressors) in the baseline econometric model. If there
are such unobserved heterogeneity across reference groups, then the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of the e¤ect of reference group visible inequality on household conspicuous consumption
may be biased.
Secondly, reference groups may not be exogenous. This problem arises if households self-select
into reference groups with specic objectives (Falk and Knell, 2004). Nesse (2004) argues that
motivated to satisfy particular psychological desires, individuals can create their own social groups.
One way of doing this is typically via migration or residential relocation (Stark and Taylor, 1991).
For instance, a poor person living in a prosperous village, to reduce his feeling of relative deprivation,
might want to relocate to a less prosperous village. Frequently there is such positive selection in
which similar people join or are assigned to the same group (Sacerdote, 2011). This positive
selection could cause substantial upward bias in the estimated magnitude of the e¤ect of reference
group visible inequality on household conspicuous consumption.
Thirdly, reference group visible inequality is, by denition, endogenous. To see this consider
a reference group g consisting of three households i; j and k with conspicuous consumption cig,
cjg and ckg respectively. Note that cig depends on cjg and ckg through is reference group visible
inequality. Likewise, cjg (ckg) depends on cig (cig) and ckg (cjg). Thus an unobserved household
specic shock that a¤ects cjg (call it "jg) also a¤ects cig. In other words, _cig is correlated with "jg:
Therefore, the reference group visible inequality faced by j (that depends on cig) will be correlated
"jg. Analogous correlation will exist between reference group visible inequality faced by households
i (k) and unobserved shock specic to household i (k). This correlation between the household
specic error term and visible inequality renders the OLS estimates of parameters of the baseline
regression model biased.
Finally, notice that apart from visible inequality, there is also another source of endogeneity in
my model. This is due to the fact that I have conspicuous consumption as my dependent variable
and total consumption expenditure (proxying permanent income) as one of my controls. Since
conspicuous consumption is a part of total consumption expenditure, any unobserved idiosyncratic
shock that a¤ects conspicuous consumption will also a¤ect total consumption, in turn, implying
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the existence of a non-zero correlation between the error term and total consumption.
2.4 Identication Strategy
To achieve model identication, I implement an approach based on instrumental variables (IV). I
instrument reference group visible inequality by measures of reference group income inequality and
reference group educational inequality. More precisely, I use (log) standard deviation of reference
group income, standard deviation of reference group literacy status (whether literate or not) and
(log) standard deviation of reference group educational attainment (number of years of education)
as instruments for (log) standard deviation of reference group conspicuous consumption which mea-
sures the reference group visible inequality.13 The instruments work well under three conditions.
First, own income, own literacy status and, own educational attainment should be signicantly
correlated with own conspicuous spending as a result, (log) standard deviation of peer income,
standard deviation of peer literacy status, and (log) standard deviation of peer educational at-
tainment should a¤ect (log) standard deviation of peer conspicuous consumption. Second, income,
literacy status and educational attainment should be household specic and should not a¤ect con-
spicuous spending decisions of other households, even those located in the same village. Third,
village level unobservables a¤ecting conspicuous consumption, if present, should be uncorrelated
with the exogenous characteristics of the households.
I argue that the rst two conditions are likely to hold in my setup due to the following reasons.
Firstly, income, literacy status and educational attainment, undoubtedly, are crucial determinants
of own conspicuous consumption. Secondly, peer income and peer educational characteristics are
typically opaque measures as argued by Hicks and Hicks (2014), and hence, are not visible to
a household. In other words, people are typically unaware of others income and educational
characteristics even if they live in the same village (or neighborhood). Hence it is not possible for
households to condition their own conspicuous spending decisions on these peer attributes. Finally,
even if peer income, peer literacy status and peer educational attainment are assumed to be partially
visible, it is hard to think of channels (that are distinct from peer group visible inequality) through
which these peer attributes a¤ect householdsown conspicuous spending.14
13A similar strategy is used widely in estimation of spatial econometric models (Gibbons et al., 2015) and models
of social interaction (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Helmers and Patnam, 2014; McVicar and Polanski, 2014).
14 In the Supplementary Appendix, I allow reference group income inequality to have a direct e¤ect on household
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Unlike the rst two conditions, the third condition required for the proposed set of instruments
to be valid may not always hold in practice. This is especially true if there is the possibility of
households self-selecting into villages via migration. But this, perhaps, is not a cause of concern
in my case, given that the spatial mobility is extremely low in India (Munshi and Rosenzweig,
2009). In fact, as Ravallion and Lokshin (2005) argue, people in rural India typically live in the
same village or nearby for most of their lives. However, even in absence of a self-selection into
villages, one might argue that there might be some other village specic characteristics correlated
with the characteristics of the households living in it. To alleviate this concern, I incorporate a full
set of district xed e¤ects. Districts, which represent administrative divisions of an Indian state,
are clusters of several villages located in the same geographical area.15 The logic behind including
the district xed e¤ects is that these would capture the unobserved heterogeneity at the level of
districts. Since villages within a particular district are likely to be similar,16 the incorporation
of the district xed e¤ects should be su¢ cient for the above discussed IV strategy to produce
unbiased parameter estimates even allowing for village-specic unobservables to be correlated with
the regressors.17
I also need to instrument (log) total consumption expenditure - used as a proxy for household
permanent income - which is endogenous due to the reasons mentioned previously. Following
Charles et al. (2009) and Khamis et al. (2012), I use a vector of income controls to instrument
for total consumption expenditure. This vector consists of (log) current income and an indicator
variable for whether current income takes the value zero.
To establish the validity of my instruments and rule out any weak instrumentsconcern, I carry
out all the standard IV diagnostic tests which are described in details below.
conspicuous spending to examine whether this instrument works even if the exclusion restriction is not satised.
15 In India, as of 2014, there are 29 states and, on an average, there are 23 districts in each state.
16 In India, districts are divided on the basis of ethical, cultural and social interaction rather on the basis of easiness
or prosperity (Indian National Census, 2011). As such, villages within a particular district are likely to be similar
along observable and unobservable ethical and cultural dimensions.
17This amounts to saying that for the IV strategy to work, correlated unobservables may be present at the district
level but not at the village level. Also note that, my identication strategy ensures that it is not the price e¤ect
that is driving my result. This is because my IV strategy will produce consistent parameter estimates even when
there are unobserved di¤erences in prices of conspicuous goods across villages. In fact, if prices are the only omitted
village level characteristics, I do not even need to use district xed e¤ects since prices, presumably, are uncorrelated
with the demographic characteristics of households.
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2.5 Model Estimation and Diagnostic Tests
I estimate my baseline model by the technique of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) cluster-
ing standard errors at the state level.18 Since my model is overidentied, I report the two-step GMM
estimates or optimal GMM estimates, which is the most e¢ cient GMM estimator for overidentied
models with heteroscedastic errors of unknown form (for a detailed overview of the two-step GMM
see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 and Baum et al., 2007).
Several diagnostic tests are conducted to assess the reliability and e¢ ciency of the two-step
GMM. Firstly, I report Hansens (1982) J statistic, which is an overidentication test for the
validity of the instruments. The joint null hypothesis of this test is that the instruments are
valid instruments (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term), and that the excluded instruments are
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of the null hypothesis casts doubt
on the validity of the instruments. Next, I report the Kleibergen and Paaps (2006) rk LM test
which seeks to test whether that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous
regressors. The null hypothesis of this test is that the minimum canonical correlation between
the endogenous variables and the instruments is not statistically di¤erent from zero. Rejection of
the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identied. Further, since IV estimates based on
weak instruments are biased towards OLS estimates (Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997;
Stock et al., 2002), I report Angrist and Pischkes (2009) multivariate F-statistic from the rst
stage regressions which is the test to examine strength of instruments in a model with multiple
endogenous variables. Following Staiger and Stock (1997), researchers usually use an F-statistic
value of 10 (or higher) as an indication of a strong instrument.
18 I cluster standard errors at the state level (instead of village or district level) following the proposal of Cameron
and Miller (2015). They recommend using bigger and more aggregate clusters, up to and including the point at which
there is concern about having too few clusters. For instance, if the dataset includes individuals within counties within
states, Cameron and Miller (2015) recommend clustering at the state level since if there is within-state crosscounty
correlation of the regressors and errors, then ignoring this correlation (for example, by clustering at the county level)
would lead to incorrect inference.
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3 Results
3.1 Main Results
Table 2 reports the two-step GMM estimates of my baseline econometric model. I report results
of several specications. My preferred specication is the one which includes the full set of de-
mographic controls and district xed e¤ects, in addition to reference group visible inequality and
household permanent income, as the right hand side variables. The results of my preferred speci-
cation is reported in column 4. Column 1 reports the results for the specication in which I do not
include any district xed e¤ects or demographic controls other than permanent income. Column 2
reports the results for the specication in which I control for permanent income and other house-
hold characteristics but do not include district dummies. Column 3 reports the regression results
when district xed e¤ects are included as regressors but not the vector of demographic controls.19
First, notice that each specication performs fairly well in terms of the Hansens (1982) overi-
dentication test, Kleibergen and Paaps (2006) rk LM test for underidentication as well as Angrist
and Pischkes (2009) multivariate F test to assess the strength of the instruments. More precisely,
in three out of four specications - including my preferred specication (column 4) - based on
the Hansens (1982) J statistic, I am strongly unable to reject the joint null hypothesis that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation. I can, however, only weakly reject this joint null hypothesis
in the second specication. Next, across all specications reported, the estimated Kleibergen and
Paaps (2006) rk LM statistic allows me to clearly reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressors and that the model is not identied. Finally, the
multivariate F-statistic (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) computed for each endogenous variable lies
well above 10 across all specications, which clearly indicates that none of the specications su¤er
from the weak instrument problem.
In terms of actual two-step GMM estimates, I nd a negative and statistically signicant impact
of visible inequality on conspicuous spending across all specications with magnitudes of the coef-
cients ranging between -0.07 (s.e. = 0.03) and -0.13 (s.e. = 0.05). Notice that the magnitudes of
these coe¢ cients are economically signicant as well, since these coe¢ cients of visible inequality can
19See Tables SA2 and SA3 in the Supplementary Appendix for OLS and IV rst-stage results.
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be interpreted as elasticities given that both conspicuous expenditure as well as visible inequality
are in logarithms.
To get a deeper sense of the economic signicance of these estimated elasticities, I calculate the
impact of a standard deviation change in visible inequality on household conspicuous expenditure.
Judging from the specication in column 4, evaluated at the sample mean, a one standard deviation
decline in (log) visible inequality (roughly 1.30) implies 0.11 log points increase in conspicuous
consumption expenditure, which translates into an increase in the level of conspicuous consumption
expenditure by roughly a factor of 1.15 (=exp(1.30 x 0.11)), or 15%. This implies that a household
spending close to the mean level of Rs. 8,200 ($126) on conspicuous goods will increase its spending
by Rs. 1,230 ($19) to a level close to Rs. 9,500 ($146) in response to a one standard deviation fall
in (log) visible inequality. Overall, thus, my results suggest the existence of a negative relationship
between reference group visible inequality and household conspicuous consumption expenditure.
This is in conformity to the hypothesis of status competition.
3.2 Subsample Analysis
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation carried out to examine the e¤ect of reference group vis-
ible inequality on conspicuous consumption expenditure of households when the estimation sample
is cut in di¤erent ways. This allows me to examine if the relation between reference group visible
inequality and household conspicuous spending are di¤erent for some sub-populations than others.
I nd that the sign of the e¤ect of visible inequality on household conspicuous consumption is
consistently negative across all the di¤erent subsamples.20 However, the magnitude of this e¤ect
seems to vary across subsamples when the sample is split along certain dimensions. For example,
the impact of visible inequality on conspicuous consumption is much higher for households headed
by younger individuals (i.e. those who are below 45 years of age, which is the median age of the
households in the working sample) and/or unmarried individuals compared to those that are headed
by relatively older and/or married individuals. This may be because younger and/or unmarried
people, given their greater involvement in marriage and other social markets as they search for
20That the e¤ect of visible inequality on conspicuous consumption is negative for the subsample that includes
relatively poor households as well as for that which includes relatively rich households is, in particular, noteworthy.
This is because the status competition hypothesis predicts that a fall in reference group visible inequality would
cause an increase in conspicuous consumption for everyone in the reference group. Thus, this nding enhances the
credibility of the hypothesized mechanism.
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spouses, are likely to be more concerned than the married people about outsiders assessment
of their social status (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Charles et al., 2009) and hence respond
more to status competition brought about by a fall in the level of visible inequality. Additionally,
the subsample analysis reveals a clear gender dimension in the impact of visible inequality on
conspicuous consumption: The increase in conspicuous consumption in response to a fall in visible
inequality is substantially more for female headed households than male headed ones. Thus, female
headed households seem to be more responsive to status competition compared to male headed
households. On a broader level this indicates that women, compared to men, might have a lower
level of self-control and are, therefore, more susceptible to social pressure.
3.3 Non-Conspicuous Consumption
If households spend more on conspicuous goods in response to a fall in reference group visible
inequality, on what expenditures do they spend less? The intertemporal budget constraint implies
that the observed higher spending on conspicuous goods must come from another component of
current consumption and/or from future consumption (i.e. current savings) and/or from taking
up more loans. Table 4 looks at the impact of reference group visible inequality on spending of
households on other consumption categories. Along with conspicuous consumption, these consump-
tion categories compose the universe of consumption expenditures in the IHDS. The coe¢ cients in
Table 4 come from a regression identical to that reported in column 4 of Table 2, except that the
dependent variable is now the log of the particular non-conspicuous consumption category.
I nd that households spend signicantly less on education in response to a fall in reference
group visible inequality. The e¤ect of reference group visible inequality on expenditure on food
and health expenditure are not signicant.21 This indicates that the higher conspicuous spending
of rural households owing to greater status competition is diverted from education spending.
3.4 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of the estimated impacted of reference group visible inequality on household
conspicuous consumption, I carry out a series of robustness checks. Strikingly, I nd that my main
21However, note that that since more than 30% of the sampled rural households report zero health expenditure,
the t of the model with ln(Health) as the dependent variable is extremely poor, and hence the ndings based on it
may not be very reliable.
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results are robust to changes in the denition of conspicuous consumption, changes in the denition
of reference group, changes in the metric used to measure visible inequality, as well as to inclusion
of mean and median reference group (permanent) income as additional controls. Additionally, I
show that households spend more on conspicuous consumption when local density(Chai and Kaus,
2013) increases (i.e. the proportion of households in a particular households social space increases),
which is suggestive of the fact that the mechanism driving my ndings is indeed status competition.
Finally, I nd that my results remain qualitatively unaltered even when I let reference group income
inequality (which is my key instrumental variable) to have a direct impact on household conspicuous
expenditure (Conley et al., 2012). Detailed discussion of all the robustness checks can be found in
the Supplementary Appendix.
4 Conclusion
The status competition hypothesis predicts that if agents care about their social status as deter-
mined by their rank in the distribution of conspicuous consumption expenditure, a fall in reference
group visible inequality (i.e. the dispersion of conspicuous consumption expenditure within refer-
ence group) is likely to cause them to increase their spending on conspicuous goods. Such spending,
in anticipation of achieving higher societal rank, not only represents ine¢ cient diversion of resources
from other consumption categories and/or savings, but is also wastefulas rank improvement does
not materialize due to parallel action of others in the comparator group.
In this paper I empirically examine the main prediction of the status competition hypothesis.
Using microlevel data from rural India, consonant with the status competition hypothesis, I nd
that a reduction in visible inequality within reference groups does indeed cause household spending
on conspicuous goods to increase signicantly. My results also indicate that the higher conspicuous
spending of the rural households is drawn from education spending. My ndings are robust to a
number of alternative specications, as well as to alternative denitions of conspicuous consumption,
visible inequality and reference group.
While I do nd that greater equality increases status competition and causes people to spend
more on conspicuous consumption, it should be noted that this is not in itself an argument for main-
taining or extending existing inequality. Rather, my ndings suggest that redistributive policies
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that (directly or indirectly) reduce the level of local visible inequality may have unintended side-
e¤ects and casts doubt about the e¤ectiveness of such policies in augmenting economic e¢ ciency
and social justice. As such, a more e¤ective approach might be to combine such redistributive
policies with social policies focusing on relationships with friends, neighbors and coworkers (Ord-
abayeva and Chandon, 2011) that represses ones desire to compete in status. One way to do
this, as suggested by Putnam (2007), is to promote a broad sense of weamong members of the
same community or reference groups through popular culture, education and common experiences.
Such policies might not eliminate status competition entirely but might be helpful in transform-
ing and moderating the adverse e¤ects of falling inequality and consequent status competition on
consumption behavior of households.
Future work in this area should focus more on exploring the role of status seeking behavior
and status competition as the key drivers of the relation between localinequality and conspicuous
spending behavior of economic agents. Further research is also needed to have a better understand-
ing of how traditional redistributive policies might be combined with social policies to minimize
conspicuous arms races.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (the Appendix and the data les) is available online at the OUP website.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variable     
Conspicuous Consumption 8,149 26,070 
ln(Conspicuous Consumption) 8.68 1.41 
Measure of Visible Inequality   
σ (Conspicuous Consumption) 13,543 21,412 
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 8.71 1.30 
Demographics   
Income 40,071 52,479 
ln(Income) 10.80 1.11 
Total Consumption Expenditure 44,770 44,083 
ln(Total Consumption Expenditure) 11.13 0.70 
Household Size 5.33 2.47 
Age 44.70 11.09 
Male (=1 if household head is male) 0.91 0.29 
Married (=1 if household head is married) 0.88 0.33 
Literate (=1 if household head is literate) 0.60 0.49 
Years of Education (of household head) 4.46 4.47 
Household member proportion: 0-14 years 0.30 0.23 
Household member proportion: 15-21 years 0.14 0.18 
Household member proportion: >21 years 0.55 0.21 
Household married members: Zero 0.07 0.25 
Household married members: 1-5 0.89 0.32 
Household married members: >5 0.05 0.21 
Poor (=1 if officially classified as poor) 0.21 0.41 
Years in Village (=1 if years in same village >10) 0.97 0.16 
Media Exposure: Men 0.77 0.42 
Media Exposure: Women 0.70 0.46 
Media Exposure: Children 0.66 0.47 
Upper Caste Brahmin 0.04 0.19 
Upper Caste Non-Brahmin 0.14 0.35 
OBC 0.36 0.48 
Dalit 0.23 0.42 
Adivasi 0.11 0.32 
Muslim 0.09 0.29 
Sikh/Jain 0.01 0.11 
Christian 0.01 0.12 
N 23,471 
Table 2. Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household Conspicuous Consumption: Instrumental Variables Approach 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] 
          
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) -0.095** -0.131*** -0.067** -0.082*** 
 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.027) (0.027) 
ln(Permanent Income) 1.396*** 1.373*** 1.545*** 1.791*** 
 
(0.049) (0.116) (0.031) (0.069) 
Demographic Controls NO YES NO YES 
District Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES 
     Observations 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.457 0.256 0.456 0.300 
Hansen J statistic 5.373 7.001 3.699 1.536 
 
[p=0.146] [p=0.0719] [p=0.296] [p=0.674] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 16.790 18.180 15.400 17.190 
 
[p=0.002] [p=0.001] [p=0.003] [p=0.001] 
Angrist Pischke F-statistics 
        ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 38.900 57.510 57.180 60.580 
    ln(Permanent Income) 106.290 79.670 149.360 87.780 
 Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous Consumption). ln σ(Conspicuous 
Consumption)  measures the reference group visible inequality which is the natural log of standard deviation of 
conspicuous consumption expenditure of households at the village level. The set of demographic controls include 
Household size, Age, Age2, Male, Married, Poor, Literate, Years of Education, Household member prop.: 0-14 years, 
Household member prop.: 15-21 years, Household member prop.: > 21 years, Household married members: Zero, 
Household married members: 1-5, Media Exposure (Men), Media Exposure (Women), Media Exposure (Children), Years 
in Village, Upper Caste Brahmin, Upper Caste Non-Brahmin, Dalit, Adivasi, Muslim, Sikh/Jain. ln σ(Conspicuous 
Consumption) and ln(Permanent Income) are endogenous. First stage instruments include ln(Income) which is the natural 
log of household (reported) income, Zero Income which is a dummy taking a value 1 if household income is zero,  ln 
σ(Income) which denotes natural log of standard deviation of income of households at the village level, σ(Literate) which 
denotes of standard deviation of literacy state (indicated by the dummy variable Literate) of household heads at the village 
level and σ(Education) which denotes standard deviation of years of education of household heads at the village level. All 
village level measures are calculated leaving out the focal household. All regressions include a constant.  Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses clustered at state level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
Table 3. Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household Conspicuous Consumption: Subsample Analysis     
 Subsample 
Variables 
Relatively 
Poor 
Relatively 
Rich Age<45 Age≥45 
Not 
Married Married Female Male 
Education 
≤10years 
Education 
>10 years 
           
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) -0.123*** -0.115*** -0.082** -0.077** -0.202*** -0.078*** -0.150** -0.082*** -0.071*** -0.225*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0317) (0.032) (0.031) (0.055) (0.025) (0.067) (0.025) (0.025) (0.073) 
ln(Permanent Income) 1.814*** 1.965*** 1.862*** 1.797*** 1.759*** 1.806*** 1.884*** 1.796*** 1.831*** 1.544*** 
 (0.241) (0.0867) (0.092) (0.089) (0.155) (0.079) (0.230) (0.082) (0.080) (0.089) 
           
Observations 12,104 11,366 11,251 12,218 2,852 20,610 2,160 21,296 21,458 1,989 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.284 0.247 0.314 0.230 0.296 0.211 0.295 0.281 0.344 
Hansen J statistic 0.0373 1.805 5.103 2.466 3.892 0.794 3.363 0.928 3.687 6.643 
 [p=0.998] [p=0.614] [p=0.164] [p=0.481] [p=0.273] [p=0.851] [p=0.339] [p=0.819] [p=0.297] [p=0.084] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 18.09 16.48 16.42 16.78 16.37 16.79 16.45 16.86 17.67 14.60 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.002] [p=0.003] [p=0.002] [p=0.003] [p=0.002] [p=0.002] [p=0.002] [p=0.001] [p=0.005] 
Angrist Pischke F-statistics           
   ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 34.23 49.51 36.14 58.87 31.20 62.16 30.37 61.57 57.63 24.35 
   ln(Permanent Income) 29.71 57.00 43.87 96.61 59.41 74.49 26.89 86.20 72.23 29.07 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous Consumption). ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) and ln(Permanent Income) are endogenous. All 
specifications include demographic controls and district fixed effects. Relatively Poor (Rich) subsample includes those households whose permanent income is lesser than or equal to 
(strictly greater than) group median permanent income. For definition of variables, full list of demographic controls and first stage instruments see note below Table 2 and main text. 
All regressions include a constant. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses clustered at state level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
Table 4. Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household Non-Conspicuous Consumption: 
Different Categories 
 Dependent Variable 
Variables ln(Food) ln(Food+) ln(Health) ln(Education) 
     
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) -0.014 -0.011 -0.069 0.169** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.077) (0.082) 
ln(Permanent Income) 0.391*** 0.730*** -0.236 0.517*** 
 (0.041) (0.031) (0.182) (0.194) 
     
Observations 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.441 0.604 -0.009 0.343 
Hansen J statistic 4.835 4.772 1.977 5.426 
 [p=0.184] [p=0.189] [p=0.577] [p=0.143] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 19.18 19.18 19.18 19.18 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.001] [p=0.001] 
Angrist Pischke F-statistics     
    ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 59.87 59.87 59.87 59.87 
    ln(Permanent Income) 135.76 135.76 135.76 135.76 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Food includes annual household expenditure on rice, wheat, 
sugar, kerosene, other cereals, cereal products and pulses. Food+ includes all items under the Food 
category plus meat, sweeteners, edible oil, eggs, milk, milk products, vegetables, salt, other food items, 
tobacco, fruits and nuts. Health includes annual household expenditure on out-patient and in-patient 
services. Education includes annual household expenditure on school fees, books and school supplies. 
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) and ln(Permanent Income) are endogenous. All specifications include 
demographic controls and district fixed effects. For definition of variables, full list of demographic 
controls and first stage instruments, see note below Table 2 and main text. All regressions include a 
constant.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses clustered at state level. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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1 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of my main results, I carry out several robustness checks in this section.
Alternate Denitions of Conspicuous Consumption. In my rst check, I examine whether
the identied e¤ect of reference group visible inequality on conspicuous spending of households is
robust to alternate denitions of conspicuous consumption expenditure. Specically, I use three
di¤erent denitions of conspicuous consumption: Charles et al. (2009), He¤etz et al. (2011) as
adopted by Friehe and Mechtel (2014)1 and Friehe and Mechtels (2014) own denition. Results
of the regressions estimated using these alternative denitions of conspicuous consumption are
reported in Table SA4.
I nd the estimated coe¢ cient of visible inequality to be negative and highly signicant in
each of the specications. The average value of the coe¢ cient of visible inequality based on these
specications is roughly -0.08 which is exactly equal to that obtained from my preferred baseline
model (where I dened the conspicuous consumption basket based on Khamis et al.s (2012) survey).
This indicates that the identied relation between reference group visible inequality and conspicuous
consumption expenditure is robust to variations in denitions of conspicuous spending and that
the baseline ndings are not driven in anyway by how conspicuous consumption is dened.
Alternate Measures of Visible Inequality. Next, instead of measuring reference group visible
inequality as log of standard deviation of conspicuous expenditure within reference group, I use
the Gini coe¢ cient and coe¢ cient of variation (both calculated at the village level leaving out the
focal individual as before) to measure the degree of visible inequality within the reference group.
The main criticism that is often levelled against using of the second moment as a measure of
inequality is that it is not scale-invariant and it depends on the measurement unit: for example,
by multiplying all income of the baseline distribution by a number , the variance increases by
2. This problem can be typically avoided by alternative scale invariantmeasures of inequality
like the Gini coe¢ cient and coe¢ cient of variation. Thus, although these measures (particularly
1He¤etz (2011) constructs a list of visible goods ranked according to degree of visibility. Following Friehe and
Mechtel (2014), I use the goods that are ranked between 2 and 11 by He¤etz (2011) to construct the He¤etzbasket
of conspicuous goods. Although as per He¤etzsurvey cigarettes seem to be most visible (and hence is ranked rst),
this item is exclude from the basket of conspicuous goods as cigarettes do not fulll the second requirement of our
denition of conspicuous consumption namely, the impression that those who consume more of it are, on average,
better o¤ than individuals who consume less (Friehe and Mechtel, 2014).
1
Gini index) may not be as appropriate as the second moment to capture the local dispersion or
spread of conspicuous consumption, using these as alternative ways to measure reference group
visible inequality would give an idea about the extent to which the relation between reference
group visible inequality and household conspicuous spending is sensitive to how visible inequality
is measured.
Table SA5 reports the results obtained from two step GMM regressions when using the alternate
unit free measures of reference group visible inequality. I nd that, when Gini index is used as
measure of visible inequality instead of natural log of standard deviation, visible inequality has
a signicant negative e¤ect on household conspicuous expenditure. More specically, when the
Gini index increases by 0.1, household conspicuous spending drops by roughly 5%. The impact
of visible inequality on conspicuous consumption is also negative and statistically signicant when
visible inequality is measured by coe¢ cient of variation. These results imply that the relation
between reference group visible inequality and conspicuous consumption is not driven by how
visible inequality is measured.
Caste- and Religion-based Reference Group. The importance of caste and religious group
a¢ liation in determining householdssocial identity particularly in India has been highlighted in
various studies (see for instance Khamis et al., 2012). This in turn could potentially imply that
self-identication is stronger among members of the same social group living in the same region
than among households living in the same locality but belonging to very di¤erent social groups.
To acknowledge this fact, I construct reference groups based on caste and religious a¢ liation of
households.
The ideal way to construct reference groups for households would be based on caste/religion and
village of residence instead of districts. However, I am unable to do so purely because of inadequate
availability of data (i.e. this yields too many reference groups with tiny numbers of households). As
an alternative, I assume a householdsreference group includes members of the same caste/religion
living in the same district.2
This alternative denition of reference group, however, has a serious limitation. This is par-
2For the purpose of constructing the reference groups based on district and caste/religious a¢ liation, I combine
the Upper Caste Brahmins and Upper Caste Non-Brahmins as well as Sikhs/Jains and Christians given that Upper
Caste Brahmins and Christians had only few observations.
2
ticularly due to the fact that the geographical area that districts typically represent are possibly
too large for households to form comparator groups based upon. In other words, households may
identify more with people of their own caste and religion group, but it is impossible for them to be
inuenced by other households who live in di¤erent villages as it is unlikely that they ever socially
interact. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to check the sensitivity of my results obtained under
this alternate denition of reference group.
From Table SA6, I nd that results of regressions, when reference groups are dened based on
caste/religion and district, are very similar to that obtained in my baseline analysis. The coe¢ cients
of visible inequality turns out to be negative and statistically signicant when visible inequality
is measured either by log of standard deviation, by coe¢ cient of variation or by Gini index. To
get a sense of economic signicance, I calculate the impact of a one standard deviation change
in reference group visible inequality on conspicuous consumption based on the results reported in
column (1). I nd that, one standard deviation fall in the level of reference group visible inequality
as measured by the log of standard deviation of conspicuous consumption causes household spending
on conspicuous goods to increase by approximately 16%. Overall, the results indicate that changing
the denition of reference groups does not cause estimates of the e¤ect of reference group visible
inequality on household conspicuous consumption to di¤er signicantly.
Investigating Omitted Variable Bias. A potential concern about my baseline econometric
model is that there might be some omitted group level factors (that vary across villages within
districts) inuencing household conspicuous consumption. A prime example of such a factor is
group level income. Given that prior studies (e.g. Charles et al., 2009) document a positive
relationship between mean group income and conspicuous spending of households, not controlling
for group mean income may bias my estimates of visible inequality. To address this concern, I
re-estimate my basic estimating equation but now controlling for group level income. Specically,
I estimate the following two di¤erent versions of my baseline econometric model:
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ln(Conspicuous Consumption)ig = + (V isible Inequality) ig +  ln(Permanent Income)ig
+ ln(Mean Permanent Income) ig +X0ig+ ig; (1)
i = 1; 2; :::Ng; g = 1; 2; :::; G:
ln(Conspicuous Consumption)ig = + (V isible Inequality) ig +  ln(Permanent Income)ig
+ ln(Median Permanent Income) ig +X0ig+ ig; (2)
i = 1; 2; :::Ng; g = 1; 2; :::; G:
where permanent income as before is proxied by total consumption expenditure as in Charles et
al. (2009). Note that I control for mean and median group permanent income and not reported
income since, as noted in the main paper, it is only the permanent component of reported income
that a¤ects consumption expenditure. Thus, any e¤ect of group level income should operate only
through permanent income.
Table SA7 report the regression results of these alternate specications. Reassuringly, I nd
that inclusion of group mean and median permanent income does not signicantly change the
estimated coe¢ cient of visible inequality compared to the results from my preferred specication.
Moreover, the coe¢ cients of mean and median group permanent income themselves are statistically
insignicant implying that these variables do not a¤ect household conspicuous consumption, once
group visible inequality is controlled for. This suggests that my baseline results do not su¤er from
bias due to omission of group level income variables.
Local Density. This paper, based on Hopkins and Kornienko (2009) argues that a fall in within
reference group visible inequality causes household conspicuous consumption to increase owing to
greater status competition. Now, greater status competition essentially means a greater density
of the conspicuous consumption distribution (since, denser is the distribution, easier it becomes
for an individual to surpass her neighbors and greater is his/her returns from investing in conspic-
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uous goods). Thus, a way to verify whether households increase their spending on conspicuous
consumption owing to greater status competition is to examine the link between density of con-
spicuous consumption distribution and household conspicuous consumption. To do this, I closely
follow a novel approach developed by Chai and Kaus (2013). Specically, I create a measure of
local density of conspicuous consumption distribution which is the share of households within
a social group that have similar conspicuous consumption expenditure (within a bandwidth b of
conspicuous consumption) to a given household (Local Density_b). After creating this measure,
I use this, rst, as an alternate index of visible inequality, and second, as a covariate in addition
to my baseline measure of visible inequality. Needless to say that my measure of local density of
conspicuous consumption is endogenous and hence is instrumented by local density of income.
Table SA8 reports the results of regressions based on this approach. I use two alternative
bandwidths - 5% and 10%. Results reported in columns (1) and (2) show that an increase in local
density causes households to spend more on conspicuous consumption. This is in consonance with
the prediction of the status competition hypothesis. However, when I control for visible inequality
(as measured by natural log of standard deviation of conspicuous consumption) in columns (3) and
(4), the coe¢ cient of local density continues to be positive but is no longer signicant. Moreover,
the coe¢ cient of visible inequality, in line with my baseline results turns out to be negative and
signicant. This implies that my index of local density was actually picking up the e¤ect of visible
inequality (and also that my baseline model does not su¤er from omitted variable bias). This is
not very surprising, since both local density and visible inequality are likely to be capturing the
same e¤ect in my model. This is because my baseline measure of visible inequality is very localized
given that my reference groups are fairly small.
Sensitivity Analysis of Instrumental Variables. One criticism that is often levelled against the
instruments used for model identication is that they might not satisfy the exclusion restriction. In
the present case this concern is not valid for the instruments used for total consumption expenditure
(which proxies permanent income) because income can only a¤ect conspicuous consumption through
total consumption since conspicuous consumption is a part of total consumption. However, it might
be worthwhile to check the sensitivity of my baseline results when a small direct impact of the
instruments, which are used to instrument reference group visible inequality, are allowed for. In
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other words, it might be useful to check whether my baseline regression results are sensitive when
I treat these instruments as only plausibly exogenous.
To do so, I follow the method proposed in Conley et al. (2012). To x ideas, suppose that the
true model is given by
Y = X	1 + Z	2 + " (3)
X = 	3Z +  (4)
where Y denotes the N1 vector of outcomes which is ln(Conspicuous Consumption), X
denotes N  2 of matrix of endogenous variables which are V isible Inequality and ln(Permanent
Income) with parameter of interest 	1, Z is an N  r matrix of instruments with r  2, 	3 is the
matrix of rst stage coe¢ cients and 	2 is the parameter measuring the plausibility of the exclusion
restriction. Notice that I omit other covariates and district xed e¤ects purely for notational
convenience. Further, note that, as per the baseline specication, I have ve instruments for two
endogenous variables. However, now I use only two of the ve instruments, one for each endogenous
variable implying that r = 2. Specically, I instrument ln(Permanent Income) by ln(Income)
and V isible Inequality by Income Inequality: I reduce the set of the instruments purely due to
computational purposes. As such, in this modied set up, the set of plausibly exogenous variables
that I have to deal with consists only of Income Inequality (since, Income is exogenous as argued
above).
A valid instrument requires 	2  0. Conley et al. (2012) seek to construct a valid condence
interval for 	1 even when this requirement does not hold. Their approach is referred to as the Union
of Condence Intervals (UCI) with 	2 support assumption approach. The approach assumes that
	2 2  , where   is the bounded support of 	2. If the true value of 	2 was the value e	2 2  , then
one could subtract e	2Z from both sides of the Equation (3) and estimate
eY = Y   Z e	2 = X	1 + " (5)
and obtain an estimate of 	1 via two stage least squares (TSLS) using Z as instruments. Moreover,
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one could construct a symmetric (1   )% condence interval, CIN (1   ; e	2), based on the
asymptotic variance of the TSLS estimator. However, in reality, the true value of 	2 is unknown.
Consequently, one can estimate 	1 for all values within the support   via TSLS regressions of eY
on X and construct the union of resulting condence intervals [e	22 CIN (1  ; e	2):
Since we know that e	2 2   and that the intervals CIN (1   ; e	2) were all constructed such
that Prf	1 2 CIN (1  ; e	2)g ! (1  ) when 	2 = e	2, it follows that asymptotically Prf	1 2
[e	22 CIN (1  ; e	2)g  1  : That is, [e	22 CIN (1  ; e	2) will cover the true parameter value
of 	1 with at least probability (1  ) asymptotically.
To implement the UCI approach, one has to start with making some assumption about the
interval for  . Since it is not easy to think of channels through which income inequality may have
impact on conspicuous spending other than through visible inequality, I assume that 	2 close to
zero. Moreover, since the direction of the e¤ect (if any) is not clear a priori, I use a symmetric
support centred at zero:   = f ; g for di¤erent values of :
The results are shown in Figure SA1. The gure shows how large the exclusion restriction
violation would need to be in order to invalidate my baseline form results. Panel A (B) is basedon
the regression without (with) district xed e¤ect. I nd that without district xed e¤ects, if the
exclusion restriction violation is small (i.e.   0:05); then the true value of the coe¢ cient of
visible inequality is indeed negative. This is in consonant with my baseline results. The condence
intervals include the zero value only if the direct impact of income inequality is su¢ ciently high.
When district xed e¤ects are added, the size of the the exclusion violation required to invalidate
my baseline results falls only slightly. Therefore, even if 	2 6= 0; as long as the exclusion restriction
violation is small enough, the baseline results remains - at least qualitatively - unchanged.
This exercise, therefore, increases my condence in the set of instruments used in estimating
the baseline econometric model.
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Table SA1. Definition of Conspicuous Consumption Expenditure 
    
Expenditure Category 
Khamis et al. 
(2012) 
Charles et al. 
(2009) 
Heffetz 
(2011) 
Friehe and 
Mechtel (2014) 
Personal Transport Equipment (includes bicycle, scooter, car etc.)    
Footwear  
 

Vacations 
  

Furnitures and Fixtures (includes bedstead, almirah, suitcase, carpet, paintings, etc.) 
 
 
Social Functions (marriage, funerals, gifts, etc.) 
   
Repairs and Maintenance (of residential buildings, bathroom equipments etc.) 
   
House rent and other rents (including expense on rented household appliances, furnitures etc.)  
  
Entertainment (includes cinema, picnic, sports-club fees and video cassettes)  
  
Clothing and Bedding 
 
 
Jewelry 
 
 
Recreation goods (includes TV, radio, taperecorder, musical instruments)  
 
 
Personal goods (includes clock, watch, PC, telephone, mobile etc.)  
  

Paan, tobacco and other intoxicants 
  

 
Services (domestic servants etc.) 
  

 
Food at restaurants 
  
 
Telephone, cable and internet 
   

Personal care (includes spectacles, umbrella, torch, lighter etc.)      
 
Notes: The dependent variable, ln(Conspicuous Consumption), in the baseline analysis is defined following Khamis et al. (2012)’s definition. Other definitions are used to 
check robustness of baseline results. 
 
Table SA2. Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household Conspicuous Consumption: OLS 
Approach 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 0.0687*** 0.0614*** -0.0194 -0.0237 
 (0.0257) (0.0234) (0.0204) (0.0212) 
ln(Permanent Income) 1.342*** 1.378*** 1.453*** 1.509*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0486) (0.0328) (0.0443) 
Demographic Controls NO YES NO YES 
District Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES 
     
Observations 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478 0.295 0.459 0.313 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous Consumption). For definition of variables and full 
list of demographic controls, see note below Table 2 and main text. Heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses clustered at state level. All regressions include a constant. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
Table SA3. IV First Stage Results (corresponding to Table 2) 
 Dependent Variable 
 Specification [1] Specification [2] Specification [3] Specification [4] 
Variables 
 
ln(Permanent 
Income) 
ln 
σ(Conspicuous 
Consumption) 
 
ln(Permanent 
Income) 
ln 
σ(Conspicuous 
Consumption) 
 
ln(Permanent 
Income) 
ln 
σ(Conspicuous 
Consumption) 
 
ln(Permanent 
Income)) 
ln 
σ(Conspicuous 
Consumption) 
         
ln(Income) 0.330*** 0.00334 0.146*** -0.0560 0.317*** 0.00164 0.143*** -0.0167 
 (0.0175) (0.0290) (0.0113) (0.0344) (0.0158) (0.0105) (0.00885) (0.0123) 
Zero Income 3.308*** 0.221 1.529*** -0.419 3.115*** 0.146 1.486*** -0.0368 
 (0.187) (0.285) (0.104) (0.324) (0.153) (0.142) (0.0988) (0.150) 
ln σ(Income) 0.124*** 0.658*** 0.0635*** 0.606*** 0.0185* 0.462*** 0.00757 0.458*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0602) (0.0164) (0.0449) (0.0106) (0.0609) (0.00756) (0.0602) 
σ (Literate) -0.304*** -0.0864 -0.100* 0.0184 -0.222*** -0.437* -0.0593* -0.390 
 (0.0986) (0.425) (0.0525) (0.382) (0.0516) (0.237) (0.0346) (0.231) 
σ (Education) 0.0453*** 0.155*** 0.00767 0.122*** 0.0287*** 0.150*** 0.00880* 0.143*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0357) (0.00723) (0.0370) (0.00747) (0.0295) (0.00444) (0.0298) 
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
District Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.279 0.184 0.609 0.222 0.226 0.120 0.537 0.124 
 Notes: Estimation via OLS. Results correspond to different specifications reported in Table 2 (main text). For each specification in Table 2, there are two endogenous variables, 
ln(Permanent Income)(proxied by ln(Total Consumption Expenditure)) and ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) which are instrumented. Hence, there are two first stage 
regressions corresponding to each specification.  The dependent variables in each of the above specification are these endogenous variables (given in the column-headings). ln 
σ(Conspicuous Consumption) denotes natural log of standard deviation of conspicuous consumption expenditure of households at the village level leaving out the focal 
household. Zero Income is a dummy takes a value 1 if households have zero income. ln σ(Income) denotes natural log of standard deviation of income of households at the 
reference group level leaving out the focal household. σ(Literate) denotes standard deviation of Literate (dummy variable that takes value 1 if HH is literate) of household head 
at the reference group level leaving out the focal household. σ(Education) denotes standard deviation of years of education of household head at the reference group level 
leaving out the focal household. For the full list of demographic controls, see note below Table 2 (main text). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses clustered at state level. All regressions include a constant. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 Table SA4. Robustness of Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household Conspicuous 
Consumption: Alternate Definitions of Conspicuous Consumption 
  Definition of Conspicuous Consumption 
Variables 
Charles et al. 
(2009) 
Heffetz 
(2011) 
Friehe and 
Mechtel 
(2014) 
        
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) -0.071*** -0.123*** -0.043** 
 
(0.024) (0.037) (0.020) 
ln (Permanent Income) 1.583*** 1.747*** 1.926*** 
 
(0.09) (0.076) (0.09) 
    Observations 23,469 23,470 23,471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.251 0.226 0.310 
Hansen J statistic 3.263 3.319 4.834 
 
[p=0.353] [p=0.345] [p=0.184] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 16.520 16.850 16.820 
 
[p=0.002] [p=0.002] [p=0.002] 
Angrist Pischke F statistic 
   
    ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 82.780 49.060 106.070 
    ln (Permanent Income) 87.330 88.240 87.210 
    
        
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous Consumption). 
See Appendix Table 1 for a complete list of goods included in the conspicuous consumption basket 
as per each definition. ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) and ln(Permanent Income) are endogenous. 
All specifications include demographic controls and district fixed effects. For definition of variables, 
full list of demographic controls and first stage instruments, see note below Table 2 and main text. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses clustered at state level. All 
regressions include a constant.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
 Table SA5. Robustness of Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household 
Conspicuous Consumption: Alternate Measures of Visible Inequality 
Variables [1] [2] 
      
Gini (Conspicuous Consumption) -0.471**  
 (0.221)  
CV(Conspicuous Consumption)  -0.141* 
  (0.076) 
ln(Permanent Income) 1.802*** 1.820*** 
 (0.071) (0.067) 
   
Observations 23,471 23,401 
R-squared 0.467 0.464 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460 0.456 
Hansen J statistic 0.331 3.803 
 [p=0.565] [p=0.149] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 16.020 14.590 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.002] 
Angrist Pischke F statistic   
    Gini (Conspicuous Consumption) 21.660  
    CV(Conspicuous Consumption)  9.860 
    ln(Permanent Income) 158.090 105.610 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous 
Consumption). Specification [1] uses Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) and specification 
[2] uses CV(Conspicuous Consumption) as the measure of visible inequality. 
Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) is defined as the Gini coefficient of conspicuous 
expenditure of households at the village level leaving out the focal household, and 
CV(Conspicuous Consumption) is defined as the coefficient of variation of conspicuous 
expenditure of households at the village level leaving out the focal household. 
CV(Conspicuous Consumption), Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) and ln(Permanent 
Income) are endogenous. CV(Conspicuous Consumption) is instrumented by CV(Income), 
Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) is instrumented by Gini(Income). All specifications 
include demographic controls and district fixed effects. For full list of demographic 
variables, and instruments for ln(Permanent Income), see note below Table 2 and main text. 
All regressions include a constant. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses clustered at state level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
Table SA6. Robustness of Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household Conspicuous 
Consumption: Alternate Definition of Reference Group  
Variables [1] [2] [3] 
        
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) -0.130*** 
  
 
(0.048) 
  CV (Conspicuous Consumption) 
 
-0.165* 
 
  
(0.089) 
 Gini (Conspicuous Consumption) 
  
-0.717** 
   
(0.318) 
ln(Permanent Income) 1.802*** 1.790*** 1.799*** 
 
(0.073) (0.071) (0.073) 
    Observations 23,308 23,309 23,309 
Adjusted R-squared 0.452 0.451 0.454 
Hansen J statistic 0.379 0.373 0.384 
 
[p=0.538] [p=0.541] [p=0.536] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 16.200 6.170 16.120 
 
[p=0.000] [p=0.045] [p=0.000] 
Angrist Pischke F statistic 
       ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 19.080 
      CV (Conspicuous Consumption) 
 
7.810 
     Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) 
  
13.950 
    ln(Permanent Income) 164.350 166.310 165.950 
 Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous Consumption). 
Reference group of a household includes other households of the household’s district of 
residence having same caste/religious affiliation. ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) denotes 
natural log of standard deviation of conspicuous consumption expenditure of households at the 
village level leaving out the focal household. CV(Conspicuous Consumption) is defined as the 
coefficient of variation of conspicuous expenditure of households at the village (reference group) 
level leaving out the focal household and Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) is defined as the Gini 
coefficient of conspicuous expenditure of households at the village (reference group) level 
leaving out the focal household. ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption), CV(Conspicuous 
Consumption), Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) and ln(Permanent Income)are endogenous. 
CV(Conspicuous Consumption) and Gini(Conspicuous Consumption) are instrumented by 
CV(Income) and Gini(Income respectively). All specifications include demographic controls and 
district fixed effects. For full list of demographic controls and first stage instruments for 
ln(Permanent Income), see note below Table 2 (main text). All regressions include a constant.  
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses clustered at state level. *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
Table SA7. Robustness of Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household 
Conspicuous Consumption: Additional Group-Level Income Controls 
Variables [1] [2] 
   
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) -0.095* -0.094** 
 (0.054) (0.037) 
ln(Permanent Income) 1.812*** 1.812*** 
 (0.065) (0.069) 
ln Mean(Permanent Income) 0.078  
 (0.135)  
ln Median(Permanent Income)  0.051 
  (0.108) 
   
Observations 23,471 23,471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298 0.297 
Hansen J statistic 3.941 0.421 
 [p=0.558] [p=0.810] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 15.97 15.86 
 [p=0.014] [p=0.001] 
Angrist Pischke F-statistics   
    ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) 3.95 13.5 
    ln(Permanent Income) 63.78 116.66 
    ln Mean(Permanent Income) 20.56  
    ln Median(Permanent Income)  91.01 
   
 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous 
Consumption). ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption), ln(Permanent Income), ln 
Mean(Permanent Income) and ln Median(Permanent Income) are endogenous. 
First stage instruments include ln(Income), Zero Income, ln σ(Income), ln 
σ(Literate), ln σ(Years of Education), ln Mean(Literate), ln Mean(Years of 
Education) and ln Median(Income). ln σ(.), ln Mean(.) and ln Median(.) are 
measured at the village level leaving out the focal individual. All specifications 
include demographic controls and district fixed effects. For complete list of 
demographic controls, see note below Table 2 (main text). All regressions include 
a constant.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
clustered at state level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
Table SA8. Robustness of Estimated Impact of Visible Inequality on Household Conspicuous 
Consumption: ‘Local Density’ Approach 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] 
         
Local Density_5% 4.448*  3.329  
 (2.371)  (2.499)  
Local Density_10%  2.359*  1.974 
  (1.286)  (1.282) 
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption)   -0.0609* -0.0580** 
   (0.0335) (0.0275) 
ln(Permanent Income) 1.835*** 1.840*** 1.813*** 1.819*** 
 (0.0885) (0.0857) (0.0794) (0.0808) 
     
Observations 23,471 23,471 23,471 23,471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.226 0.265 0.254 0.274 
Hansen J statistic 0.158 0.156 1.266 1.450 
 [p=0.691] [p=0.692] [p=0.737] [p=0.694] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 8.940 11.25 9.312 13.24 
 [p=0.011] [p=0.003] [p=0.054] [p=0.010] 
Angrist Pischke F-statistics     
    Local Density_5% 11.09  5.82  
    Local Density_10%  11.55  11.64 
    ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption)   51.03 63.79 
    ln(Permanent Income) 158.72 162.14 89.60 89.60 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. The dependent variable is ln(Conspicuous Consumption). ln 
σ(Conspicuous Consumption) denotes natural log of standard deviation of conspicuous consumption 
expenditure of households at the village level leaving out the focal household. Local Density_5% (10%) is 
measured as the proportion of households within a village having conspicuous expenditure with 5%(10%) 
bandwidth of the focal household’s own conspicuous expenditure. Local Density_5%, Local Density_10%, 
ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption) and ln(Permanent Income) are endogenous.  Local Density_5% and Local 
Density_10% are instrumented by local densities calculated for the respective bandwidths based on Income. 
All specifications include demographic controls and district fixed effects. For full list of demographic controls 
and first stage instruments for ln(Permanent Income) and ln σ(Conspicuous Consumption), see note below 
Table 2 (main text). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses clustered at state 
level. All regressions include a constant. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
Figure SA1. Sensitivity Analysis of Instruments: UCI Approach (Conley et al., 2012) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
(A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (C) 
(B) 
 
Notes: 
1. Figures show how large the exclusion restriction violation would need to be in order to invalidate the baseline form results. 
2. (A) – Excluding district fixed effects, and (B) – Including district fixed effects. 
3. The dashed lines plot the union of confidence intervals. Blue line denotes the actual two stage least square estimates. 
4. Beta denotes coefficient of visible inequality, Delta represents possible values of coefficient of income inequality had it been a 
part of the second stage. 
4. Figures produced using the 'plausexog' code in Stata. 
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